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Abstract
This paper shows that, controlling for standard determinants of net external positions,
ﬁnancially-remote countries exhibit more positive net external positions. This ﬁnding is
found to be stronger for less advanced countries, hinting at external funding problems for
more remote countries. Being located near ﬁnancially very open countries, being in currency
unions with creditor countries, or being highly integrated through ﬁnancial and trade linkages
with a ‘core’ country facilitates net external borrowing. Consequently, evidence is found for
an important role of geographic and bilateral factors for a country’s net external wealth.
Keywords: net foreign assets, cross-border investment, distance, proximity
JEL Classiﬁcation: F21, F34, F415
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Non-technical summary
This paper integrates two major research areas - the analysis of external imbalances and studies
of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment.
By focusing on the net external position and its long-term determinants such as GDP per
capita, the demographic structure, and the level of public debt, we analyse why countries are
persistent net creditors or net debtors. In particular, we investigate if the geographic location of
a country has an impact on the ability to raise external funding. To this end, we modify various
concepts of the bilateral asset trade literature and test their relevance for the net external
position.
Based on the idea of increasing ﬁnancial intermediation costs with distance, we use a unilat-
eral concept of distance, namely international ﬁnancial remoteness as introduced by Rose and
Spiegel (2009).
In addition, we employ further concepts from the bilateral asset trade literature in a unilateral
framework. Starting from bilateral datasets, we construct composite measures of - for instance
- ﬁnancial openness of neighbour countries or fellow currency union countries and test their
relevance for a country’s net external position.
Countries might also be able to participate in world ﬁnancial or goods markets by being
integrated with a ‘core’ country. This notion, dating back to Baumol (1986), postulates that
speciﬁc convergence clubs of a core (leader) and a periphery (converging countries) exhibit
spillovers from the core to the periphery via extensive trade and ﬁnancial linkages. We apply
the concepts of bilateral ﬁnancial and trade linkages by identifying a core country and the level of
integration with this core country for each economy in our sample and investigate if integration
with the core has an impact on net external funding.
Our ﬁndings show that geography matters: controlling for standard determinants of net
external positions, ﬁnancially-remote countries exhibit robustly more positive net external po-
sitions. This hints at diﬃculties to receive net external funding for countries that are more
‘remote’ from major creditor countries and ﬁnancial centres. This ﬁnding is even stronger for a
subsample of emerging and developing countries.
Being located near ﬁnancially very open countries, being in currency unions with creditor
countries, or being highly integrated through ﬁnancial and trade linkages with a ‘core’ country
facilitates net external borrowing. Consequently, evidence is found for an important role of
geographic and bilateral factors for a country’s net external wealth.
Moreover we ﬁnd an asymmetry in the way foreign asset and foreign liability positions are
aﬀected by ﬁnancial remoteness. Financially-remote countries are able to overcome remoteness
with regard to investing overseas, whereas inward investments are negatively inﬂuenced by a
remote geographic location. We attribute this net funding problem to the positive correla-
tion between distance and informational asymmetries as well as limited access to international
ﬁnancial markets.6
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1 Introduction
This paper integrates two major research areas - the analysis of external imbalances and stud-
ies of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment. We investigate if a country’s
geographical location aﬀects its ability to raise net external funding.
The net external position of a country is an important steady-state variable which is crucial
in order to understand short-term capital ﬂows. As shown by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a
2001b, and 2002), long-term fundamentals such as GDP per capita, the demographic structure,
the level of public debt, and country size are important determinants in explaining the level of
a country’s net external position. These fundamentals help explain why countries are persistent
net creditors or net debtors. Theoretically, net external positions ensure that capital is allocated
to the most productive nations. Moreover, intertemporal consumption smoothing works through
this channel internationally.1
The role of geographical and bilateral factors for a country’s net external position is largely
unexplored. In the literature on bilateral asset trade, it is well established that geography
matters. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Portes and Rey (2005) show that
bilateral distance and other proxies for informational asymmetries such as common language,
colonial ties, and currency unions are crucial in explaining bilateral asset holdings and ﬂows,
respectively. Daude and Stein (2007) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in time zones is also important
for bilateral (foreign direct) investments. Thus, asset trade can be explained by gravity models
that are very similar to models of bilateral trade, implying a home bias or rather a proximity
bias.
There is evidence for a proximity bias in the ﬁnancial sector due to diﬀerences in access
to ﬁnancial services and information asymmetries that are increasing in distance. Coval and
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that returns of fund managers in the United States are higher
from investing in ﬁrms in close proximity. Also ﬁnancial analysts tend to be more accurate
in their assessments the closer they are located to a ﬁrm (Malloy, 2005). Petersen and Rajan
(2002) ﬁnd that borrower quality increases with distance, as banks are unwilling to lend at great
distances to problem borrowers whose loans would require more active monitoring.2
We build on the literature above by investigating how geographic and bilateral factors in-
ﬂuence the net external position of a country. The determinants of bilateral holdings can aﬀect
gross aggregate positions: as we expect a ﬁnancially-remote country to be less integrated with
the rest of the world, it might receive less inward capital ﬂows which could translate into prob-
lems in generating net external funding.
1The net external position of the United States has been analysed in-depth over the last years. Gourinchas
and Rey (2007) and Habib (2010), among others, ﬁnd evidence for an ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the United States
by running sizeable excess returns on its net external position before the crisis period. This goes along with a net
foreign asset position that is less negative than suggested by the current account deﬁcits of the United States.
2However, for example Huberman (2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) propose that proximate invest-
ments can be better explained by a behavioural familiarity bias rather than by informational asymmetries.7
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Based on the idea of increasing ﬁnancial intermediation costs with distance, Rose and Spiegel
(2009) introduce a unilateral concept of distance, namely international ﬁnancial remoteness.
They ﬁnd that countries that are remote from ﬁnancial activity (deﬁned by the closest distance
to one of the world’s major ﬁnancial centres - London, New York, and Tokyo) are systemically
more volatile in terms of output and consumption growth. We use a similar concept in order to
obtain remoteness measures for each country, namely the minimum distance and minimum time
zone diﬀerence to one of the eight largest creditor countries that are consequently the major
providers of external funding. We include these ﬁnancial remoteness measures in standard net
external position estimations.
Going beyond measures of distance there are more bilateral concepts potentially aﬀecting net
external positions. As we carry out our analysis in a unilateral framework, we apply Baicker’s
(2005) notion of neighbourliness which she uses to examine spillovers of ﬁscal policy among US
states. We apply her idea of geographic contiguity and use further concepts from the bilateral
asset trade literature in a unilateral framework. Starting from bilateral datasets, we construct
composite measures of - for instance - ﬁnancial openness of neighbour countries and test their
relevance for the net external position.
Countries might also be able to participate in world ﬁnancial or goods markets by being
integrated with a ‘core’ country. This notion, dating back to Baumol (1986), postulates that
speciﬁc convergence clubs of a core (leader) and a periphery (converging countries) exhibit
spillovers from the core to the periphery via extensive trade and ﬁnancial linkages. We apply
the concepts of bilateral ﬁnancial and trade linkages by identifying a core country and the level of
integration with this core country for each economy in our sample and investigate if integration
with the core has an impact on net external funding.
The theoretical framework of this paper is shaped by the models of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2001) and Martin and Rey (2004). In both models, (asset) trade costs induce home bias in
ﬁnancial holdings. Trade costs in the models represent transaction and information costs in a
broader sense. Fazio, MacDonald, and Melitz (2008) ﬁnd strong empirical support for Obstfeld’s
and Rogoﬀ’s hypothesis that trade costs are the key to explaining the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle.
They ﬁnd this to be consistent with persistent net external positions and trade balances as
observed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002).
There are no strong theoretical or empirical priors about the role of ﬁnancial remoteness and
other bilateral factors for net external positions. From the ﬁndings by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008), Portes and Rey (2005), and Daude and Stein (2007) we know that geographic factors
are important for bilateral asset trade. Consequently, it is of high interest to analyse the impact
of these factors for a country’s net external wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 theoretical issues are raised,
followed by the empirical strategy in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section
4, and Section 5 concludes.8
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2 Theoretical Issues
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) show that trade costs can have large eﬀects on macroeconomic
phenomena. Obviously, bilateral factors such as geographical barriers imply higher trade and
transaction costs. In their model, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ demonstrate that higher trade costs in
goods can explain home bias in equity holdings (representing overall asset holdings).
Martin and Rey (2004) focus on incomplete asset markets and transaction (iceberg) costs in
ﬁnancial markets. In their framework, assets are endogenously created leading to larger countries
having larger asset markets, while a reduction in ﬁnancial trade costs leads to more international
asset trade. Frictions in asset trade through asymmetric information costs between home and
foreign agents induce home bias in equity holdings. The gravity models of Milesi-Ferretti (2008)
and Portes and Rey (2005) support these theories by ﬁnding a signiﬁcant role for standard
geographic determinants as well as informational distance proxies.
If we drop the assumption of symmetric transaction costs across all countries, we can spec-
ulate about the impact of geographic and bilateral factors on the net external position. As
each country exhibits a unique geographic position in the world, ﬁnancial trade costs vis-a-vis
the rest of the world (as for instance proxied by the degree of ﬁnancial remoteness) are of an
idiosyncratic nature. This may entail distinctive foreign asset and liability positions for each
country and the emergence of external imbalances.
Based on the theoretical and empirical asset trade literature, a ﬁnancially-remote country is
less likely to be involved substantially in international ﬁnancial trade. However, for a small open
economy, an asymmetry in the way ﬁnancial remoteness aﬀects foreign assets and liabilities is
probable: on the capital outﬂow side, geographic barriers are more likely to be overcome by a
‘remote’ country actively seeking to pursue an internationally-oriented investment strategy (for
example in the form of a national pension fund). On the inﬂow side, however, remoteness can
translate into problems in generating net external funding. For a small open remote economy, it
might be very problematic to come into the focus of international investors as well as to receive
substantial investments given increasing information costs and informational asymmetries with
distance.
Put diﬀerently, ﬁnancial remoteness functions as an asymmetric tax that is levied on the
return on foreign liabilities, but not on the return on foreign assets. Consequently, the foreign
asset accumulation is not (or only to a lesser extent) distorted by ﬁnancial remoteness, whereas
foreign liabilities are subject to a ‘remoteness’ tax.
For a small open economy this asymmetry results in a more positive net external position
(hence a lower, less negative, net foreign liability position). For remote countries that seek net
external funding based on their macroeconomic fundamentals, a disadvantageous geographic
location can thus be an impediment to achieving the desired net external position.
We test this formally by including variables from the bilateral concepts of ﬁnancial remote-
ness, neighbourliness, and convergence clubs in the net external position estimations framework.9
ECB




The empirical framework focuses on a static long-run relation using a cross-sectional approach.
We include the net external position (as a ratio to GDP) as an average over the period of
2005-2007. The control variables are measured in 2005 values. As there is not much time-series
variation in many of our bilateral variables, a cross-sectional approach seems more appropriate
than a panel estimation. Various bilateral concepts are introduced in the estimation. We
estimate the regression speciﬁcations by least squares using heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors:
NFAi = α + βBilaterali + γXi + ei (1)
where Bilaterali represents various bilateral concepts. Speciﬁcally, we include international ﬁ-
nancial remoteness, various measures of neighbourliness as well as ﬁnancial and trade integration
indicators based on the convergence clubs concept (see Section 3.3 for details). Xi is a set of
control variables building on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a 2001b, and 2002) and comprises
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in PPP terms using constant international dollars),
the demographic structure, the level of public debt, and the natural logarithm of population size
(see Section 3.2 for details).
We beneﬁt from the updated and extended version of the dataset on external positions
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). This dataset covers 178 economies. After
matching it with the explanatory variables (see Appendix A1 for details on the country sample
and data sources), we are left with a cross-section of 153 countries that we reduce to 149
countries by excluding countries that have a net external position that is larger than 200% of
GDP (Kuwait, Lybia, Hong Kong) or smaller than -200% of GDP (Guinea-Bissau).
We use both the full sample of 149 countries, as well as a narrow sample of 119 countries that
excludes the 30 most advanced countries (in terms of GDP per capita) as we expect diﬀerences
in the way the bilateral concepts aﬀect net external funding based on the stage of development of
an economy.3 Conceptually, less advanced countries might be more reliant on external funding
in order to facilitate investments that lead to higher economic growth and convergence with
the group of advanced countries. For the group of advanced countries, we expect this relation
to be less pronounced. First, these countries are more likely to be well-integrated into the
world economy, hence raising external capital should be less diﬃcult even for remote advanced
countries.4 Second, given that these countries have reached a high level of economic development,
3This corresponds to excluding countries from the reduced sample that are above the 80th percentile in terms
of GDP per capita. All of these belong to the group of high-income countries as deﬁned by the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. See Appendix A1 for a list of these countries.
4Australia and New Zealand are both very remote countries while also being substantial net debtors with net
external positions of -61% and -89%, respectively, over the period of 2005-2007. This circumstance supports the10
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they are likely to have more savings and less investments, leading to less demand for net external
funding. In the narrow sample, 100 out of 119 (84%) countries are net debtors, whereas only 19
out of 30 (63%) advanced countries are net debtors. Considering a net liability position of 0.25%
of GDP as a cut-oﬀ point, we ﬁnd 66% of the less developed sample to be even more indebted,
whereas only 20% of the advanced countries exhibit a higher net liability position. Third, in
the less advanced sample, the major international creditor countries and ﬁnancial centres (see
Section 3.3.1) are excluded. This avoids a potential blurring of these estimations, as for example
for the United States the impact of ﬁnancial remoteness might be diﬀerent compared to other
countries as it is one of the eight major gross creditor countries and New York is one of the
world’s three major ﬁnancial centres.
Less advanced countries are expected to be ‘natural’ net debtor countries that are in need of
downhill international capital ﬂows. Given the theoretical considerations presented in Section
2, international ﬁnancial remoteness might be a severe impediment to receiving the desired level
of net external funding for this group of countries.
3.2 Control Variables
We build our empirical speciﬁcations on previous work by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a,
2001b, and 2002).
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti ﬁnd a positive relation between net foreign assets and GDP per
capita in cross-sectional estimations. Various channels can explain this result: if an economy
grows richer, the marginal product of capital (and hence domestic investment) decreases. A rise
in income can also be associated with more domestic savings. Both factors can lead to more
investments abroad.
Furthermore, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) show that demography is a very important
determinant of net external positions. We employ the entire age distribution in our empirical
work as proposed by Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998). This is crucial, as for
instance, a relatively young workforce may be associated with relatively low savings and high
investments whereas an older workforce may be associated with a rise in the net foreign asset
position, as saving for retirement becomes more urgent and domestic investment falls. Coun-
tries with a high age-dependency ratio might start accumulating overseas assets to generate
international investment income. A high youth dependency ratio may be associated with a high
investment rate (to ﬁnance social infrastructure investments). Consequently, we follow Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2002) and use the entire age distribution of a country in order to account for the
diﬀerent demographic channels. We restrict the coeﬃcients on the population share variables
to lie along a cubic polynomial, so that only three composite demographic variables are entered
into the regression speciﬁcation (see Appendix A2 for details).
hypothesis of rich countries being less aﬀected by ﬁnancial remoteness. As a robustness check we also include
Australia and New Zealand in the less advanced sample (based on their large net foreign liability positions), but
ﬁnd the results of the empirical analysis to hold nonetheless.11
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We also consider the level of public debt. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcient on the level of public debt for developing countries. This non-Ricardian
behaviour implies that higher levels of public debt are not fully oﬀset by an increase in private
asset accumulation.5 Hence, more public debt might be associated with a decline in the net
external position.
In addition, we control for country size by including the natural logarithm of population, as
a large country may be more diversiﬁed and hence faces less external risk than a smaller country.
Also larger countries might be more likely to set up a stock market or attract the interest of
international investors.
As additional variables, we use de-facto (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) and de-jure (Chinn
and Ito, 2008) international ﬁnancial integration. These variables might be associated with
easier access to external funding, thus lower net external positions.6
3.3 Bilateral Concepts for Financial Remoteness
3.3.1 International Financial Remoteness
The concept of international ﬁnancial remoteness was introduced by Rose and Spiegel (2009).
They use the natural logarithm of the distance to the closest ﬁnancial centre (London, New
York, and Tokyo) as their prime measure of remoteness.
First, we use as a remoteness measure the minimum distance to the eight largest gross
creditor countries (in terms of US dollars), hence the eight countries that exhibit the largest
foreign asset positions in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).7 As a robustness check we use the
distance to the eight largest gross capital exporters using ﬁnancial ﬂows data from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics and ﬁnd very similar results. Here we use the total of gross
capital outﬂows, that is the sum of portfolio investments, foreign direct investments, and ‘other’
and reserve asset ﬂows.8
Second, we also consider ‘time distance’ as measured by the minimum diﬀerence in time
zones to one of the eight largest creditor countries. Daude and Stein (2007) show that time
zone diﬀerence is a signiﬁcant negative factor in FDI and goods trade. The rationale for using
5Non-Ricardian behaviour means that the government’s budget constraint is not internalised by private eco-
nomic agents.
6In addition, we included the share of natural resources in total exports as a high share of natural resources
can be associated with accumulated export revenue. On the other hand, it could also attract FDI inﬂows.
Moreover, we include stock market capitalisation (as a ratio) to GDP, a domestic ﬁnancial reform index from
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008), and an aggregate measure of country risk. Among these variables, the
ﬁnancial reform index is the only one found to be signiﬁcant (with a negative sign). However, the inclusion of
these variables reduces the sample size substantially such that the regression results are not reported. We leave
it for further research to explore for example the role of cultural factors such as diﬀerences in inter-temporal
preferences.
7These are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Ireland.
8In fact, very similar measures are used as robustness checks by Rose and Spiegel.12
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these two remoteness measures (both as distance and time zone diﬀerence) is to ﬁnd a proxy
for aggregate ‘access’ to foreign funds and to account for informational asymmetries that are
positively related to remoteness.
As an additional robustness check, we weight the distances to the eight largest creditor
countries by the inverse of the share of the investments actually received from these countries.
Using data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) on total portfolio
investment positions, we construct the share of investments made by the eight largest creditor
countries. Thus instead of using an unweighted distance measure, we employ:






where TAji are the portfolio investments ‘Top-8’ creditor country j invests in host country i, and
n−1 
k=1
TAki are the total portfolio investments held by foreign investors in country i. We weight
by the inverse of the share as the distance to a country which invests a large amount in host
country i should receive a lower value than the distance to a country that invests only little in
the host country. To illustrate, if the distance from country A to both country B and country
C amounts to 1,000 km, but 50% of the foreign portfolio liabilities of country A are held by
country B and only 10% by country C, the weighted distance to country B amounts to 2,000
km, whereas the distance to country C is 10,000 km. The rationale behind this weighting is to
adjust the concept of international ﬁnancial remoteness for actual investments such that actual
remoteness is relatively smaller or larger than indicated by the unweighted distance term.
Given the theoretical considerations of Section 2, we expect a positive coeﬃcient on the
remoteness variables in speciﬁcation (1) as the ease of net external funding should be decreasing
with distance to the largest creditor countries.
In order to illustrate the concept of international ﬁnancial remoteness we present the ﬁfteen
most and least remote countries in Table 1: based on the minimum distance to the eight largest
gross creditor countries, we ﬁnd New Zealand to be the most remote country, followed by
Mauritius and Japan. The least remote countries are all European-based with Belgium and the
Czech Republic being the closest countries to one of the eight largest gross creditor countries.
The histogram in Figure 1, shows the distribution of this remoteness measure for our sample.
About two thirds of the sample exhibit a minimum log distance of eight or higher (which is
equivalent to 3,000 km) to one of the eight largest gross creditors. 20 countries even have a
remoteness measure of 8.8 or larger in log terms (6,600km).
When we apply the concept of minimum diﬀerence in time zones to one of the eight largest
creditor countries, we ﬁnd a large number of countries (55) to exhibit no time zone diﬀerence to
one of the major creditor countries. The most remote country based on this measure is Japan,
followed by Samoa and the United States.13
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Weighting the ﬁrst measure by the inverse of the share of the investments actually received
(as described above), reveals a slightly altered picture: Canada is the second least remote country
(after Belgium), whereas the most remote countries are Madagascar, Bahrain, and Cambodia.
Using the measure of ﬁnancial remoteness preferred by Rose and Spiegel (2009), namely
the minimum distance to one of the three major ﬁnancial centres, reveals Belgium and the
Netherlands as being least remote, while Mauritius, Japan, and South Africa are the most
remote countries.
In Table 2, we use Spearman’s rank correlations in order to investigate the relation between
the diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial remoteness. Crucially, we ﬁnd a very high correlation coeﬃ-
cient of 0.96 between the concepts based on the distance to the largest creditor countries and the
distance to the major ﬁnancial centres. The coeﬃcient between the distance and time diﬀerence
measures amounts to 0.46, reﬂecting a less pronounced relation between the two measures. The
rank correlation between the unweighted and weighted minimum distance to one of the eight
largest creditor countries is 0.70.
3.3.2 Neighbourliness
We know from the bilateral asset trade literature, that there are further bilateral concepts
besides distance that are used as proxies for informational asymmetries. We employ a contiguous
dummy, a ‘nearby’ dummy if the distance between the capitals of two countries is less than 1,000
km, and a currency union dummy.9
Conceptually, we cannot use straightforward binary dummies like in the bilateral literature,
as we carry out the analysis in a unilateral cross-sectional framework. Thus, we start oﬀ with a
complete bilateral dataset for our country sample and use these concepts in order to construct
weighting matrices along the lines of Baicker (2005). Building on Case et al. (1993) she uses
weights that apply diﬀerent concepts of ‘neighbourliness’ in order to analyse public spending
spillovers among US states.
For instance, applying the concepts of contiguity yields a composite neighbour country for
each country.10 Accordingly, we construct weighting matrices based on contiguity, nearby coun-
tries, and currency unions in order to measure the eﬀect of de-facto and de-jure international
ﬁnancial integration and of net external positions of the composite ‘neighbour’.11
Thus, in our regression speciﬁcations, we use for instance the term W ∗IFIi, where IFI is a
vector of the gross level of foreign assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP), and W is a weighting
matrix for neighbourliness. For example, in the case of contiguity, we weight the IFI-value of
the contiguous countries by their levels of GDP. This allows for accounting for the diﬀerent sizes
9Based on Rose and Spiegel (2004), we use a strict currency union dummy that is equal to 1 if both countries
are in a currency union.
10Consequently, this composite variable is zero for an economy without any contiguous countries.
11In line with the bilateral asset trade literature, we also construct weighting matrices based on common
language between countries. However, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for these variables.14
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(and thus importance) of the various contiguous economies.12
For the variables described above, we expect a negative sign in the regression analysis as
being closer to (or being in a currency union with) a ﬁnancially very open or net creditor country
should facilitate net external funding.
3.3.3 Convergence Clubs
This concept considers the extent of ﬁnancial and trade linkages of each country with its re-
spective ‘core’ country, thus the country with which it has the deepest bilateral integration.
This idea goes back to the convergence club concept of Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986)
and has been applied to current account patterns of Emerging Asia and Emerging Europe by
Hermann and Winkler (2009).
In order to achieve convergence with a ‘leader’ country, spillovers are sought by the periphery
(catching-up or converging) countries. These spillovers work best through extensive trade and
ﬁnancial linkages with the core (Baumol, 1986).
Strictly speaking, the concept of convergence clubs applies best to emerging and developing
countries, nevertheless we also use the approach for advanced countries as close ﬁnancial and
trade linkages with another country can potentially facilitate capital imports for this group.
We apply this concept by not choosing a core country a priori as done by Hermann and
Winkler (that is based on geographic or political considerations), but use three diﬀerent quan-
titative concepts. From the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) database, we use the
consolidated foreign bank claims on each host country. Thus, the country with the highest level
of bank claims is deemed to be the host country’s respective core country and we use the actual
amount of bank claims (as a ratio to host country GDP) in order to quantify the level of banking
integration between the core and the host country.13
As an alternative measure, we use the bilateral level of total portfolio investments in each
host country as given by the IMF’s CPIS in order to determine the ‘core’ country. Equivalently,
we employ the level of the core country’s portfolio investments in the host country (as a ratio
to host country GDP) as an indicator of ﬁnancial integration with the core.14
In order to obtain a consistent measure for trade integration, we use the level of bilateral
exports from each country to the core based on data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS).15
We expect more integration with the core to signal lower trade costs, less informational
asymmetries and better funding opportunities and thus to be negatively correlated with the net
12We also experiment with diﬀerent weighting schemes, for example bilateral asset holdings and bilateral trade
and ﬁnd very similar results.
13This method reveals that Germany is the ‘core’ for many European countries (supplemented by Austria for
Eastern European countries), the United Kingdom for many Asian countries, France for a lot of African countries,
and Spain as well as the United States for Latin American countries.
14Here, the United States is the core country for the majority of Asian, European, and Latin American countries.
15For most Asian and Latin American countries, the United States is the largest export market.
external position.15
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 International Financial Remoteness
We analyse the cross-country variation in the net external position, with a particular focus on
the role of the bilateral concepts described in the last section.
First, we present some ﬁndings concerning the control variables in order to place the paper
in the existing literature on net external positions: GDP per capita exhibits a positive sign
throughout the paper which is in line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b, and 2002).16
Interestingly, the coeﬃcient is smaller (by about 50% and less signiﬁcant) for the less developed
sample hinting at an even larger correlation for the most advanced countries (compare columns
(1) and (2), Table 3).
The demographic variables are jointly signiﬁcant throughout the paper indicating that the
demographic structure of a country exerts an important impact on the net external position as
also found by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). We do not report the individual demographic
coeﬃcients as introduced in Appendix A2 since they do not have a meaningful interpretation
individually, but only jointly as parts of a cubic polynomial.17 The main ﬁndings for the full
sample (column 1) are a positive correlation with the net foreign asset position for the age
cohorts ranging from 30 to 59, whereas high youth as well as old-age dependency are associated
with a lower net external position. The relation for the less advanced sample (based on the
ﬁndings in column 4) exhibits a peak for the age group between 25 to 29, whereas a negative
impact on the net external position sets in for all age groups above the age of 40.
In line with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the
level of public debt throughout the paper. This shows that countries with larger public debt also
have larger net foreign liabilities. Thus, we ﬁnd strong evidence for non-Ricardian behaviour, as
high levels of public debt do not seem to be oﬀset by private agents. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2002) ﬁnd this result for a subsample of developing countries, whereas we conﬁrm this result
both for the full and reduced samples. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient for the less advanced sample
is about twice as large as for the full sample which suggests a higher prevalence of non-Ricardian
behaviour in emerging and developing countries.18 In addition, we control for country size and
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on the natural logarithm of population (in line with Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a and 2001b)).
16Due to recent updates by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), we are able to include 149 countries in our analysis
- compared to, for example, 61 countries for the period 1990 to 1998 in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002).
17Joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables is not found in the estimations presented in columns (2) and
(8) of Table 3. This indicates that the demographic variables are of less importance for less advanced countries
once we control for international ﬁnancial remoteness based on pure distance measures.
18This is in line with Bussiere, Fratzscher, and Mueller (2006) who show that departures from Ricardian
equivalence are especially present in liquidity constrained countries.16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1330
April 2011
Building on these standard determinants of net external positions, we innovate by including
our ﬁrst bilateral measure: international ﬁnancial remoteness. We introduce the minimum
distance to one of the eight largest international creditor nations. The variable is positive and
signiﬁcant (with a coeﬃcient of 0.093, signiﬁcant at the 10% level for the full sample (1), and
a larger coeﬃcient of 0.146, signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the reduced sample of less advanced
countries (2)). To illustrate this result, were the Slovak Republic in the geographic position of
Ukraine (which is equivalent to the Slovak Republic being more remote by 651km), the Slovak
Republic’s net external position would be less negative by eleven percentage points (that is from
-64% of GDP to -53% of GDP), ceteris paribus. By the same token, the estimation implies
that were Mexico located in the geographic location of Uruguay its net external position (as a
ratio to GDP) would be less negative by 15 percentage points. As an extreme case, had the
Czech Republic (one of the least remote countries, see Table 1) Argentina’s level of remoteness,
it would increase its net foreign asset position by about 50 percentage points (that is moving
from a net liability position of 35% to a net asset position of 15% (as a ratio to GDP)).
We can infer from this that countries that are more ‘ﬁnancially-remote’ tend to have larger
net external positions, thus their net foreign liability position is smaller in absolute terms. This
relation is stronger for the less advanced, hence natural debtor nations for whom net external
funding is more essential. Thus, proximity to major creditor countries facilitates the running of
external deﬁcits for emerging and developing economies.
In columns (3) and (4), we modify our remoteness measure by considering the minimum time
diﬀerence to one of the eight largest gross creditor nations. Here, we ﬁnd very similar evidence
for more remoteness correlating positively with a higher net external position. The coeﬃcient is
almost equal in terms of size and signiﬁcance (at the 5% level) for both the full and less advanced
samples. To exemplify the ﬁnding of column (3): were Poland (with no time zone diﬀerence to
one of the eight largest creditor countries) in the location of Russia (with Moscow having a time
zone diﬀerence of two hours to the closest of the large creditor countries) Poland’s net external
position would shift from -50% to -36% (as ratios to GDP), ceteris paribus.
In columns (5) and (6), we use the weighted remoteness measure presented in equation (2):
in line with the previous results the variable has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (at the 1%
level for the less advanced sample). Thus our weighting procedure of distance by actual portfolio
holdings, substantiates the previous ﬁndings.
Finally, we use the measure of international ﬁnancial remoteness preferred by Rose and
Spiegel (2009): the minimum distance to one of the three world ﬁnancial centres - London, New
York, and Tokyo (columns (7) and (8)). This, for the purpose of our analysis, rather coarse
measure, fails to be signiﬁcant for the full sample, but is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for the
less developed sample. This could be indicative of the fact that less advanced countries are
particularly relying on ﬁnancial interactions with these three most established markets.
On the whole, we can conclude that international ﬁnancial remoteness is robustly signiﬁcantly17
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associated with larger net external positions. This hints at diﬃculties to receive net external
funding for countries that are more ‘remote’ from world ﬁnancial activity. We can attribute these
net funding problems to the positive correlation between distance and informational asymmetries
as well as limited access to international ﬁnance. This ﬁnding is fortiﬁed by the fact that results
are stronger for the narrow sample of less advanced countries. Moreover, we give a further
potential explanation for external imbalances: next to the well-established fundamental variables
determining a country’s net external positions, there is a role for the geographic location of a
country. We will further explore the geographic dimension in the next subsection.
4.2 Neighbourliness
As outlined in Section 3.3.2, we focus on three concepts of neigbourliness: contiguity, nearby
countries, and currency unions.
In Table 4, we examine if de-facto international ﬁnancial integration, de-jure ﬁnancial open-
ness, and the net foreign asset position of the respective contiguous countries (weighted by GDP
of the contiguous countries) are statistically signiﬁcant determinants of the net foreign asset
position. We ﬁnd that none of these variables are statistically signiﬁcant.19
In Table 5, we employ a less restrictive concept: we do not focus on contiguous countries,
but on all countries where the distance between their capitals is less than 1,000 km. Strikingly,
columns (1) and (2) show that ﬁnancial openness (both de-facto and de-jure) of countries nearby
are consistent with a lower net external position. This indicates that being located near ﬁnan-
cially open countries facilitates net external borrowing. Crucially, this eﬀect is only visible in
the full sample, but not for the less advanced countries (columns (4) and (5)). This eﬀect could
be driven by European countries that are located very close to each other and also exhibit a
high degree of ﬁnancial integration with each other.
In a similar vein, we examine the role of being part of a currency union for the net external
position (Table 6). Overall, we observe that both de-facto ﬁnancial openness as well as larger net
external positions of the other currency union members are associated with lower net external
positions. Again, this is only observed for the full sample. In particular, the result regarding
net foreign assets of the other currency union members is crucial. It implies that being in a
currency union with net surplus countries, facilitates net borrowing. Anecdotally, the Euro area
ﬁts into this picture, as Germany as a persistent net surplus country invests substantially in net
debtor countries such as Greece and Spain.
To conclude, we ﬁnd an important role for the diﬀerent concepts of neigbourliness in net
external funding, which is foremost driven by the most advanced countries.
19However, the signs on the IFI and Chinn-Ito variables are negative.18
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4.3 Convergence Clubs
Following Section 3.3.3, we use three diﬀerent measures to evaluate the respective core country
for each economy and the degree of integration with the core. Starting with the level of banking
sector claims of the core country (Table 7, column 1), we ﬁnd that a higher level of bank
claims is associated with a more negative net external position (signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
This indicates that deeper integration (in terms of the banking sector) with a core economy
facilitates net borrowing.
In column (2), we use portfolio investments of the core country. Again, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcient (at the 10% level).20 We do not ﬁnd evidence for a signiﬁcant role of more
trade linkages (column 3). However, when we control for all three measures at the same time
(column 4), the bank claim measure and the trade measure both suggest that ﬁnancial and
trade linkages signiﬁcantly facilitate net borrowing. Thus, the closer the integration with a core
country, the better the access to net external funding.
For the narrow sample of less advanced countries, both the portfolio investment measure
and the level of exports to the core country are signiﬁcantly negative, whereas the banking
sector measure just fails to be signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Nevertheless, when we include all
three concepts at the same time (column 8), we obtain the same qualitative results as for the full
sample: banking sector integration and trade linkages with the core country make net borrowing
easier.
We can conclude, both for the full and less advanced sample, that close ﬁnancial and trade
integration with a ‘core’ country pays oﬀ in terms of improved net borrowing opportunities.
4.4 Overall speciﬁcation
In this subsection, we bring together the diﬀerent pieces of our analysis so far. In Table 8,
column (1) we employ the baseline estimation (without any bilateral concepts). In column (2),
we introduce three bilateral concepts: international ﬁnancial remoteness (measured by the time-
zone diﬀerence to the top-8 creditor countries), de-facto ﬁnancial openness of countries nearby,
and the level of banking sector claims of the core country.
All of these concepts exhibit the same sign as in the previous subsections and are highly
signiﬁcant. Thus, more remote countries receive less net external funding, whereas being lo-
cated close to ﬁnancially open countries and being integrated with the respective core country
facilitates net external borrowing. Also the adjusted R2 increases substantially from column (1)
to column (2) which indicates the improved goodness of ﬁt of our new speciﬁcation.
By the same token, we analyse the less advanced sample. The previously obtained results
persist (thus, ﬁnancial openness of the countries nearby is not signiﬁcant, whereas ﬁnancial
20Note that the number of observations decreases from 149 to 135, as data coverage of the CPIS database is
lower than in the BIS database.19
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remoteness is positive and signiﬁcant and integration with the core has a signiﬁcant negative
sign).
For both samples, we include de-facto and de-jure international ﬁnancial openness in order
to cross-check if these have an impact on the net external position or the bilateral concepts.
However, only de-facto openness is signiﬁcant (with a positive coeﬃcient in column (3) for the
full sample). Thus our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
4.5 Decomposition of the net external position
In Table 9, we decompose the results obtained in Table 8 along two dimensions. First, we
divide the net external position into an equity part (portfolio equity and FDI) and a debt part
(portfolio and other debt).
For the full sample, we ﬁnd the ﬁnancial remoteness indicator to be highly signiﬁcant for
the equity part, but not for the debt component. This could be the result of portfolio equity
and in particular FDI being more information-sensitive.21 In the less advanced sample we ﬁnd
a positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on ﬁnancial remoteness also for the net debt position.
For the full sample, de-facto ﬁnancial openness of countries nearby exhibits a positive sign
for the equity component, whereas we ﬁnd a negative sign for the debt component (as in the
overall estimations). Banking sector integration with the core only has an impact on the net
debt position (both for the full and reduced samples).22
Second, we distinguish between foreign assets and foreign liabilities: international ﬁnancial
remoteness is signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) with a negative sign for the total foreign liability
position, but has no impact on the foreign asset positions. Consequently, we ﬁnd additional
support for the hypothesis raised in Section 2 that ﬁnancially-remote countries have diﬃculties
raising (net) external funding, but are able to accumulate assets overseas. This holds for both
the full and less advanced samples. The other bilateral variables are not signiﬁcant for either
foreign assets nor liabilities. Thus, their impact works solely through the net position, but not
through one of the gross sides.
5 Conclusion
This paper integrates two major research areas - the analysis of external imbalances and stud-
ies of the geographical determinants of cross-border investment. We investigate the role of a
country’s geographic location for its ability to raise net external funding.
21For example, Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) suggest that that FDI is information intensive, leading
to problems for FDI investors to raise funding for their investments as they have more knowledge about their
investment than outsiders. Theoretically, Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) show that FDI investors are endowed
with better information than other foreign investors.
22Strikingly, the demographic structure is only signiﬁcant for the net debt position.20
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We ﬁnd that geography matters: controlling for standard determinants of net external po-
sitions, ﬁnancially-remote countries exhibit robustly more positive net external positions. This
hints at diﬃculties to receive net external funding for countries that are more ‘remote’ from the
major creditor countries. This ﬁnding is even stronger for a narrow sample of less advanced
countries.
We also ﬁnd that being located nearby (and being in a currency union with) ﬁnancially
very open countries, facilitates net external borrowing. In addition, close ﬁnancial and trade
integration with a ‘core’ country pays oﬀ in terms of improved net borrowing opportunities.
Consequently, evidence is found for an important role of geographic and bilateral factors for a
country’s net external wealth. The determinants of bilateral holdings also aﬀect aggregate gross
and net positions: a ﬁnancially-remote country receives substantially less net external funding.
In line with our theoretical considerations, we ﬁnd an asymmetry in the way the foreign
asset and foreign liability positions are aﬀected by ﬁnancial remoteness. Financially-remote
countries are able to overcome remoteness with regard to investing overseas, whereas inward
investments are negatively inﬂuenced by a remote geographic location. We attribute this net
funding problem to the positive correlation between distance and informational asymmetries as
well as limited access to international ﬁnance.
For future research, it would be desirable to develop a theoretical model on net external
positions and geographic factors that takes the empirical results found in this paper into con-
sideration.21
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Appendix
A1 Country Sample and Data Sources
Country sample
Albania Djibouti Lao People’s Dem. Rep Rwanda
Algeria Dominican Republic Latvia Samoa
Angola Ecuador Lebanon Saudi Arabia
Argentina Egypt Lithuania Senegal
Armenia El Salvador Macedonia Sierra Leone
Australia Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Singapore
Austria Eritrea Malawi Slovak Republic
Azerbaijan Estonia Malaysia Slovenia
Bahrain Ethiopia Maldives South Africa
Bangladesh Fiji Mali Spain
Belarus Finland Malta Sri Lanka
Belgium France Mauritania Sudan
Belize Gabon Mauritius Swaziland
Benin Gambia, The Mexico Sweden
Bhutan Georgia Moldova Switzerland
Bolivia Germany Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ghana Morocco Tajikistan
Botswana Greece Mozambique Tanzania
Brazil Grenada Namibia Thailand
Bulgaria Guatemala Nepal Togo
Burkina Faso Guinea Netherlands Tonga
Burundi Haiti New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Cambodia Honduras Nicaragua Tunisia
Cameroon Hungary Niger Turkey
Canada Iceland Nigeria Uganda
Cape Verde India Norway Ukraine
Chad Indonesia Oman United Arab Emirates
Chile Iran, Islamic Republic of Pakistan United Kingdom
China, P. R.: Mainland Ireland Panama United States
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Italy Paraguay Uzbekistan
Congo, Republic of Jamaica Peru Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
Costa Rica Japan Philippines Vietnam
Croatia Jordan Poland Yemen, Republic of
Cyprus Kazakhstan Portugal Zambia
Czech Republic Kenya Qatar
Cote d’Ivoire Korea Romania
Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Russia
Most advanced countries (in terms of GDP per capita)
Australia Finland Japan Spain
Austria France Korea Sweden
Bahrain Germany Netherlands Switzerland
Belgium Greece New Zealand United Arab Emirates
Canada Iceland Norway United Kingdom
Cyprus Ireland Qatar United States
Denmark Israel Singapore
Equatorial Guinea Italy Slovenia25
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(Net) External position Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
GDP per capita World Bank - WDI
Demographic variables United Nations (2007): World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision
Public debt Panizza (2008) and National Sources
Distance and contiguous dummy CEPII (2006)
Time diﬀerence http://www.timeanddate.com/
Currency union dummy Rose and Spiegel (2004)
Capital account openness Chinn-Ito (2008)
Bilateral bank claims BIS (2009)
Bilateral portfolio holdings IMF - CPIS (2009)
Bilateral exports IMF - DOTS (2009)26
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A2 Demographic Speciﬁcation
Our demographic speciﬁcation follows Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998), and was
introduced as a determinant of net external positions by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). We
divide the population into J = 12 age cohorts and the age variables enter the net foreign assets
equation as
12
j=1 αjpjt where pjt is the population share of cohort j in period t and
12
j=1 αj =0 .
We make the restrictions that the coeﬃcients lie along a cubic polynomial
αj = γ0 + γ1j + γ2j2 + γ3j3











In turn, we can estimate γ1, γ2, γ3 by introducing the age variables into the speciﬁcation as
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Table 4: Neighbourliness: contiguity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 0.243 0.255 0.232 0.113 0.133 0.117
[0.054]*** [0.059]*** [0.052]*** [0.057]* [0.059]** [0.056]**
Population 0.059 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.054 0.054
[0.024]** [0.023]*** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.020]*** [0.022]**
Debt to GDP -0.332 -0.339 -0.326 -0.635 -0.649 -0.654
[0.145]** [0.142]** [0.146]** [0.109]*** [0.106]*** [0.106]***
IFI of neighbours -0.002 -0.055
[0.011] [0.080]
Chinn-Ito of neighbours -0.058 -0.089
[0.061] [0.062]
NFA of neighbours 0.164 -0.153
[0.227] [0.211]
Observations 149 149 149 119 119 119
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.42
Wald test (Demography) 7.24 7.08 6.83 6.36 6.92 7.24
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP
per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as deﬁned in Appendix
A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP)
of the composite neighbour country ((1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness of the composite neighbour
country ((2) and (5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite neighbour country ((3) and
(6)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations
are reported in (1)-(3); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (4)-(6). Wald χ2 statistic and
associated p-value for joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level,
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 5: Neighbourliness: nearby countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 0.249 0.266 0.241 0.110 0.107 0.111
[0.053]*** [0.054]*** [0.053]*** [0.056]* [0.058]* [0.056]*
Population 0.053 0.072 0.057 0.052 0.050 0.055
[0.022]** [0.023]*** [0.025]** [0.021]** [0.022]** [0.022]**
Debt to GDP -0.341 -0.318 -0.332 -0.644 -0.651 -0.643
[0.147]** [0.143]** [0.145]** [0.107]*** [0.108]*** [0.106]***
IFI of nearby countries -0.056 -0.022
[0.009]*** [0.067]
Chinn-Ito of nearby countries -0.183 0.026
[0.073]** [0.060]
NFA of nearby countries 0.082 -0.126
[0.264] [0.251]
Observations 149 149 149 119 119 119
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.42
Wald test (Demography) 7.65 8.18 7.46 6.81 7.00 6.88
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP
per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as deﬁned in Appendix A2
(not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the
composite nearby country ((1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness of the composite nearby country ((2) and
(5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country ((3) and (6)). Cross-sectional
estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)-(3);
estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (4)-(6). Wald χ2 statistic and associated p-value for
joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1%
level.31
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Table 6: Neighbourliness: currency union members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 0.261 0.253 0.246 0.124 0.124 0.121
[0.055]*** [0.056]*** [0.052]*** [0.059]** [0.059]** [0.059]**
Population 0.057 0.054 0.061 0.048 0.044 0.048
[0.024]** [0.024]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.021]**
Debt to GDP -0.341 -0.332 -0.346 -0.649 -0.650 -0.645
[0.144]** [0.145]** [0.143]** [0.105]*** [0.106]*** [0.107]***
IFI of CU members -0.103 -0.115
[0.046]** [0.077]
Chinn-Ito of CU members -0.072 -0.094
[0.079] [0.065]
NFA of CU members -0.240 1.287
[0.041]*** [1.014]
Observations 149 149 149 119 119 119
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.43
Wald test (Demography) 8.00 7.20 7.23 7.75 7.66 7.45
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP
per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as deﬁned in Appendix A2
(not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of
the composite currency union member country ((1) and (4)), the Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness of the composite
currency union member country ((2) and (5)), and the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite
currency union member country ((3) and (6)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
(in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)-(3); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are
shown in (4)-(6). Wald χ2 statistic and associated p-value for joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables. * signiﬁcant
at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.32
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Table 8: Overall speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP-PC 0.242 0.275 0.231 0.267 0.111 0.161 0.156 0.174
[0.052]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.061]*** [0.056]* [0.059]*** [0.061]** [0.062]***
Population 0.058 0.030 0.040 0.030 0.052 0.050 0.052 0.047
[0.023]** [0.024] [0.024]* [0.024] [0.021]** [0.023]** [0.022]** [0.024]*
Debt to GDP -0.332 -0.357 -0.423 -0.373 -0.645 -0.596 -0.614 -0.604
[0.144]** [0.128]*** [0.127]*** [0.130]*** [0.105]*** [0.109]*** [0.143]*** [0.112]***
Int. Fin. Rem. 0.074 0.087 0.074 0.062 0.064 0.061
[0.031]** [0.031]*** [0.031]** [0.025]** [0.026]** [0.026]**
IFI close count. -0.056 -0.057 -0.056 -0.035 -0.036 -0.028
[0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.058] [0.059] [0.060]
Bank Cl. core -0.508 -0.572 -0.514 -0.304 -0.307 -0.311





Obs. 149 149 149 148 119 119 119 118
Adj. R-squared 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.44
Wald (Dem.) 7.44 7.47 7.09 7.78 7.06 7.55 7.35 7.25
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the net foreign asset position (as a ratio to GDP); the explanatory variables are GDP
per capita (in natural log form), population (in natural log form), three demographic variables as deﬁned in Appendix A2
(not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP, the minimum time diﬀerence to one of the eight largest creditor countries,
the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country, bank claims of the
core country (as a ratio to host country GDP), the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities (as a ratio to GDP) ((3) and
(7)), and the Chinn-Ito Index of ﬁnancial openness ((4) and (8)). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations are reported in (1)-(4); estimations for the sample of non-advanced
countries are shown in (5)-(8). Wald χ2 statistic and associated p-value for joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 9: Decomposition of the net external position
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NFA Eq NFA Debt TA TL NFA Eq NFA Debt TA TL
GDP-PC 0.048 0.225 0.572 0.295 -0.021 0.194 0.252 0.054
[0.040] [0.041]*** [0.134]*** [0.119]** [0.034] [0.046]*** [0.070]*** [0.065]
Population 0.036 -0.002 -0.087 -0.107 0.038 0.011 -0.042 -0.085
[0.015]** [0.019] [0.058] [0.051]** [0.014]*** [0.017] [0.039] [0.031]***
Debt to GDP -0.079 -0.353 0.440 0.849 -0.174 -0.477 0.231 0.861
[0.070] [0.094]*** [0.167]*** [0.124]*** [0.068]** [0.089]*** [0.104]** [0.119]***
Int. Fin. Rem. 0.041 0.036 -0.088 -0.168 0.047 0.026 -0.015 -0.090
[0.016]*** [0.027] [0.059] [0.057]*** [0.013]*** [0.015]* [0.025] [0.030]***
IFI close count. 0.046 -0.085 -0.017 0.030 0.035 -0.020 0.019 0.017
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.028] [0.023] [0.045] [0.042] [0.048] [0.070]
Bank Cl. core -0.129 -0.314 0.379 0.865 -0.013 -0.250 -0.043 0.262
[0.150] [0.165]* [0.656] [0.601] [0.118] [0.091]*** [0.189] [0.227]
Obs. 149 149 149 149 119 119 119 119
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.52 0.31 0.26 0.14 0.59 0.19 0.50
Wald (Dem.) 0.21 6.30 2.71 3.62 0.74 6.62 0.75 3.00
P-value 0.89 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.52 0.03
Notes: The dependent variables are the net foreign equity position (as a ratio to GDP) ((1) and (5)), the net foreign debt
position (as a ratio to GDP) ((2) and (6)), the gross foreign asset position ((3) and (7)), and the gross foreign liability
position ((4) and (8)), respectively; the explanatory variables are GDP per capita (in natural log form), population (in
natural log form), three demographic variables as deﬁned in Appendix A2 (not reported), the ratio of public debt to GDP,
the minimum time diﬀerence to one of the eight largest creditor countries, the sum of gross ﬁnancial assets and liabilities
(as a ratio to GDP) of the composite nearby country, and the bank claims of the core country (as a ratio to host country
GDP). Cross-sectional estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses). Full sample estimations
are reported in (1)-(4); estimations for the sample of non-advanced countries are shown in (5)-(8). Wald χ2 statistic and
associated p-value for joint signiﬁcance of the demographic variables. * signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level,
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level.WORKING PAPER SERIES
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